five-for-the-future/plugins/wporg-5ftf/includes/email.php
2019-10-26 10:11:45 -07:00

151 lines
5.9 KiB
PHP

<?php
/**
* Helper functions for sending emails, including authentication tokens.
*
* We don't want pledges connected to individual w.org accounts, because that would encourage people to create
* "company" accounts instead of having their contributions show up as real human beings; or because that
* individual will likely eventually leave the company, and "ownership" of the pledge would be orphaned; or
* because we'd have to tie multiple accounts to the pledge (and all the extra time/UX costs associated with that),
* and would still have problems with orphaned ownership, etc.
*
* So instead, we just ask companies to create pledges using a group email (e.g., support@wordcamp.org), and
* we email them time-restricted, once-time-use auth tokens when they want to "log in".
*
* WP "nonces" aren't ideal for this purpose from a security perspective, because they're less secure. They're
* reusable, last up to 24 hours, and have a much smaller search space in brute force attacks. They're only
* intended to prevent CSRF, and should not be used for authentication or authorization.
*
* They also create an inconsistent UX, because a nonce could be valid for 24 hours, or for 1 second, due to their
* stateless nature -- see `wp_nonce_tick()`. That would lead to some situations where a nonce had already expired
* by the time the contributor opened the email and clicked on the link.
*
* So instead, true stateful CSPRN authentication tokens are generated; see `get_authentication_url()` and
* `is_valid_authentication_token()` for details.
*
* For additional background:
* - https://stackoverflow.com/a/35715087/450127 (which is better security advice than ircmarxell's 2010 answer).
*/
namespace WordPressDotOrg\FiveForTheFuture\Email;
defined( 'WPINC' ) || die();
const TOKEN_PREFIX = '5ftf_auth_token_';
// Longer than `get_password_reset_key()` just to be safe. See https://core.trac.wordpress.org/ticket/43546#comment:34
const TOKEN_LENGTH = 32;
/**
* Wrap `wp_mail()` with shared functionality.
*
* @param string $to
* @param string $subject
* @param string $message
*
* @return bool
*/
function send_email( $to, $subject, $message ) {
$headers = array(
'From: WordPress - Five for the Future <donotreply@wordpress.org>',
'Reply-To: support@wordcamp.org',
// todo update address when new one is created
);
return wp_mail( $to, $subject, $message, $headers );
}
/**
* Generate an action URL with a secure, unique authentication token.
*
* @param int $pledge_id
* @param string $action
* @param int $action_page_id The ID of the page that the user will be taken back to, in order to process their
* confirmation request.
*
* @return string
*/
function get_authentication_url( $pledge_id, $action, $action_page_id ) {
$auth_token = array(
/*
* This will create a CSPRN and is similar to how `get_password_reset_key()` and
* `generate_recovery_mode_token()` work.
*/
'value' => wp_generate_password( TOKEN_LENGTH, false ),
// todo Ideally should encrypt at rest, see https://core.trac.wordpress.org/ticket/24783.
'expiration' => time() + ( 2 * HOUR_IN_SECONDS ),
);
/*
* Tying the token to a specific pledge is important for security, otherwise companies could get a valid token
* for their pledge, and use it to edit other company's pledges.
*
* Similarly, tying it to specific actions is also important, to protect against CSRF attacks.
*
* This function intentionally requires the caller to pass in a pledge ID and action, so that it can guarantee
* that each token will be unique across pledges and actions.
*/
update_post_meta( $pledge_id, TOKEN_PREFIX . $action, $auth_token );
$auth_url = add_query_arg(
array(
'action' => $action,
'pledge_id' => $pledge_id,
'auth_token' => $auth_token['value'],
),
get_permalink( $action_page_id )
);
// todo include a "this lnk will expire in 10 hours and after its used once" message too?
// probably, but what's the best way to do that DRYly?
return $auth_url;
}
/**
* Verify whether or not a given authentication token is valid.
*
* These tokens are more secure than WordPress' imitation nonces, because they can only be used once, and expire
* in a shorter timeframe. Like WP nonces, though, they must be tied to a specific action and post object in order
* to prevent misuse.
*
* @param $pledge_id
* @param $action
* @param $unverified_token
*
* @return bool
*/
function is_valid_authentication_token( $pledge_id, $action, $unverified_token ) {
$verified = false;
$valid_token = get_post_meta( $pledge_id, TOKEN_PREFIX . $action, true );
/*
* Later on we'll compare the value to user input, and the user could input null/false/etc, so let's guarantee
* that the thing we're comparing against is really what we expect it to be.
*/
if ( ! is_array( $valid_token ) || ! array_key_exists( 'value', $valid_token ) || ! array_key_exists( 'expiration', $valid_token ) ) {
return false;
}
if ( ! is_string( $valid_token['value'] ) || TOKEN_LENGTH !== strlen( $valid_token['value'] ) ) {
return false;
}
if ( ! is_string( $unverified_token ) || TOKEN_LENGTH !== strlen( $unverified_token ) ) {
return false;
}
if ( $valid_token && $valid_token['expiration'] > time() && hash_equals( $valid_token['value'], $unverified_token ) ) {
$verified = true;
// Tokens should not be reusable, to increase security.
delete_post_meta( $pledge_id, TOKEN_PREFIX . $action );
// todo when used to manage pledge, token will probably get deleted when viewing, and then they won't be able to save
// fix that when create the manage process, though. for now this works for confirming email address.
// maye pass a `context` param to this function, either 'view' or 'update', and only delete if context is 'update' ?
// make sure view and update functions checks to make sure have valid token, not create though
}
return $verified;
}